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Abstract
Using a recently expanded data set on supplier-customer links, we examine how customer concentration
a¤ects rm protability. We nd that the relation between customer concentration and rm protability is
more complex than recent literature suggests. We conrm that customer concentration promotes operating
e¢ ciencies for protable rms. However, we nd a di¤erent result for younger, less protable rms where
customer concentration impairs rm protability and signicantly increases distress risk. Thus, the relation
between customer-base concentration and protability is non-linear; it is signicantly negative in the early
years of a rms public life, turning positive as the relationship matures. The reason for this dynamic relation
is that rms who serve a few major customers make customer-specic investments that result in larger xed
costs and greater operating leverage. These relatively high xed costs mean that customer concentration is
risky for young rms, but can signicantly benet the rm if the relationship survives.
JEL Classications: L25; M41; G31; G33
Keywords: Customer concentration, customer-specic investment, selling, general and administrative
expense, protability, default risk.
1 Introduction
Winning the business of a major customer is an exciting event in the life of the rm. Business from
major customers can increase rm revenues markedly and permit e¢ ciencies of scale in operations
and delivery. Despite these advantages, economists have long warned of the danger of supplying a
considerable fraction of rm output to a particular customer. Lustgarten (1975) credits Galbraith
(1952) with the origin of the concept that large customers are threats to manufacturers operating
prots because, as important customers with signicant bargaining power, they can demand price
discounts from sellers. The problem with these major customers is that the margin improvements
that the supplier rm can receive, through selling e¢ ciencies or other economies of scale, do not
necessarily accrue to the rm. Major customers recognize their bargaining power and can en-
gage in ex-post renegotiation over the terms of the contract (Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978),
Williamson (1979)). Once the rm has committed resources to production for a major customer,
these customer-specic investments represent costs that the rm cannot fully recover unless they
can complete and deliver the order to the customer. Major customers can impair rm protability
by demanding price concessions, extended trade credit or other benets. For example, Balakrish-
nan, Linsmeier and Venkatachalan (1996) argue that major customers are aware of the rms cost
savings from JIT adoption, and that customer demands for concessions subsequent to JIT adoption
prevent the adopters from improving protability.1 In his empirical study of customer concentra-
tion, Lustgarten (1975) concludes that high customer concentration (at the industry level) reduces
rm protability.
Patatoukas (2012) challenges the conventional wisdom that customer concentration impairs
rm protability. Using SFAS 14 and SEC Reg S-K mandated disaggregated revenue disclosures
available from Compustat, he creates a rm-specic measure of customer concentration and nds a
positive relation between customer concentration and accounting rates of return. Taking advantage
of a recent expansion in this data set, we extend his analysis to include rms with negative operating
1Recently, Ng (2013) relates the example of Procter and Gamble who plan to extend the time they take to pay
suppliers from 45 days to 75 days.
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performance. We nd that the relation between customer concentration and protability is more
complex than a simple positive or negative relation. While we nd that many of Patatoukas
(2012) conclusions about protable rms are correct, they are not generalizable to rms with
negative operating performance. Such rms tend to be younger, their sales depend more on major
customers, their costs are more inelastic with respect to sales, they encounter greater demand
uncertainty, and they face a higher probability of nancial distress. The strong e¤ects of customer
concentration on unprotable rms produce a negative relation between customer concentration
and rm protability in the full sample. We conjecture that customer concentration increases
operating leverage: if the supplier-customer relationship is successful, then rms with high levels
of customer concentration are rewarded with high operating prots. However, if the relationship
is not successful, rms that are dependent on major customers are less protable and face greater
probabilities of nancial distress.
Following earlier studies on rm protability (Faireld and Yohn (2001), Soliman (2008)), Pata-
toukas (2012) focuses on rms with positive operating performance. While this sample selection
criterion is often unavoidable in valuation research, such as the case where negative current earnings
cannot be capitalized, the criterion can be avoided in a study of customer-supplier relations. We
argue that unprotable rms are more likely to reect the negative e¤ects of customer concentration
such as major customersdemands for price concessions. We nd that younger rms tend to have
negative operating performance (and are thus excluded by Patatoukas (2012)), and among these
rms we nd a negative relation between customer concentration and protability. Young rms
with a concentrated customer base are at risk, in line with conventional wisdom. Our evidence
suggests that only when a rm survives to a certain age does this negative relation recede and
turn positive. Analyzing the full range of rm protability allows us to reconcile the conventional
wisdom with Patatoukas(2012) results.
We examine the relation between customer concentration and rm protability over the 1977-
2007 period. Consistent with Patatoukas (2012) we nd that customer concentration has a positive
e¤ect on the rms cash conversion cycle and reduces inventory holdings, supporting Patatoukas
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(2012) conclusion that customer concentration can promote operating e¢ ciencies. However, for
both young and unprotable rms customer concentration reduces rm protability. Investigating
this result, we nd that customer concentration is generally positively related to SG&A expenses.
This relation is particularly strong for young and unprotable rms. Since SG&A expenses con-
stitute an important component of total rm costs, the relation between customer concentration
and rm protability is primarily attributable to the relation between customer concentration and
SG&A expenses.
Motivated by Williamson (1979) who recognizes the central importance of customer-specic
investments and by Anderson, Banker and Janakiramans (2003) nding that SG&A costs can be
sticky responding asymmetrically to changes in rm sales: We hypothesize that SG&A elasticity
across rms reects the existence of customer-specic investments. Customer-specic SG&A ex-
penses are, by denition, less transferable than general SG&A investments and thus cause SG&A
costs to be stickier. Probing the nature of SG&A costs to explain the patterns we observe in cus-
tomer concentration and rm protability, we nd that the elasticity of SG&A costs with respect to
sales is lower in rms with higher customer concentration. This means SG&A costs are stickier for
such rms. We argue that rms with higher customer concentration make more customer-specic
SG&A expenses believing that such customer-specic investments will lead to the operating e¢ -
ciencies documented in Patatoukas (2012).
However, as reected in lower SG&A elasticity, customer-specic SG&A investments are pre-
dominantly xed costs that are less transferable to other uses and so increase the rms operating
leverage. The e¤ect of this increase in operating leverage on rm protability varies with the rms
life cycle. We document that young rms with high customer concentration are more likely to face
nancial distress. These rms have a relatively high xed-cost component in their SG&A expenses,
and thus cannot reduce their costs signicantly if demand drops. As the supplier-customer rela-
tionship matures, the risk of nancial distress decreases; the mature rms in our sample are more
likely to capture operating e¢ ciencies that enhance protability.
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We also extend the Banker, Byzalov and Plehn-Dujowich (2012) hypothesis that cost elasticity
is related to demand uncertainty by examining the e¤ects of customer concentration on the relation
between cost elasticity and demand uncertainty. Higher customer concentration is associated with
higher demand uncertainty, exacerbating the operating leverage e¤ect. Firms with only a few major
customers have relatively undiversied sources of revenue, and their customer-specic investments
prevent them from easily nding alternative sales when faced with declining demand from their
major customers. Consistent with this argument, we nd that demand uncertainty monotonically
increases from rms in the lowest customer concentration quintile to the highest customer concen-
tration quintile. The adverse impact of higher demand uncertainty for high customer concentration
rms is especially pronounced for young rms.
We develop a dynamic life-cycle hypothesis about the e¤ects of customer concentration on rm
protability that is able to synthesize our ndings with Patatoukas (2012). We conrm Patatoukas
(2012) surprising result that, for protable rms, customer concentration can lead to some operating
e¢ ciencies. However, we contend that these e¢ ciencies come with a risk. For young rms, customer
concentration is costly and only as the relationship matures does it lead to operating e¢ ciencies
that can signicantly improve protability. Early in the rms life cycle, the high customer-specic
costs associated with customer concentration lead to higher probabilities of delisting or default.
A concentrated customer base is thus a risky choice for young rms. These rms face a trade-o¤
between higher current distress probability and the possibility of improving operating e¢ ciency
and achieving higher prots in the future.
A major contribution of this paper is that it identies the existence and magnitudes of both the
costs and benets of customer concentration. Knowledge of both the costs and benets of customer
concentration is important to managers making the crucial decision of whether to make customer-
specic investments in the relationship between the rm and a major customer. Our ability to
document the costs and benets involved in this decision supports the usefulness of mandated
disaggregated revenue disclosures and, as in Patatoukas (2012), highlights some of the benets of
improving disaggregated information about rmsoperations.
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2 Hypothesis Development
In contrast to the traditional view that major customers can extract benets from the supplier rm
and thus lower rm protability, there are several reasons why major customers could be benecial
to the rm. All orders are di¤erent, in either their design, manufacture or logistical delivery.
Meeting the demands of many small customers is expensive and rms can achieve economies of
scale from dealing with a few major customers. Although a number of small orders can produce
the same total sales as a single large order, the supplier faces the problem of customer retention and
acquisition. Customer retention and acquisition can be expensive and by dealing with a few major
customers, supplier rms can potentially reduce these costs. Cohen and Schmidt (2009) document
some of the benets of attracting large clients and Carlton (1978) outlines how a lower customer-
per-rm ratio helps the rm coordinate pricing and production decisions. Costello (2013) and
Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006) show how covenant restrictions and customer equity stakes can
alleviate contracting problems that arise in the relationship. Volume discounts to large customers
are common and reect these economies.
Investigating the empirical evidence on customer concentration and rm protability, Pata-
toukas (2012) cites two studies (Newmark (1989) and Kalwani and Narayandas (1995)) that chal-
lenge Lustgartens (1975) nding that customer concentration reduces protability. Faced with this
mixed evidence, Patatoukas (2012) argues that whether major customers are benecial or detri-
mental to the rm is ultimately an empirical issue. He answers that question in the a¢ rmative by
showing that customer concentration leads to improved protability. Firms achieve this protabil-
ity through e¢ ciencies in SG&A expenses, inventory turnover and cash conversion improvements.
However, Patatoukas (2012) conditions his empirical tests on protability, only rms with positive
prots are analyzed. Although this choice is consistent with the literature on protability, in this
case the bargaining power of major customers could introduce an endogeneity bias into the analy-
sis. Specically, because granting concessions to major customers is costly, rms earning positive
prots are likely to be less a¤ected by customers demanding concessions than rms with operating
losses. Focusing only on protable rms could restrict the sample to those rms where the ability
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of major customers to obtain price concessions and other benets is limited for some unobservable
reason.
We conjecture that developing operating e¢ ciencies from a major customer relationship is not
a straight-line process. As suggested by Galbraith (1952), Lustgarten (1975), Balakrishnan et al.
(1996), and Schloetzer (2012) major customers pose signicant risks to supplier-rm protability.
We expect to see these risks occur in unprotable rms, the sample unobserved in Patatoukas
(2012). Since young rms tend to rely more on major customers and are more likely to be unprof-
itable, we expect the relation between customer concentration and rm protability to vary with
rm age. For young, unprotable rms we expect the relation between customer concentration and
protability to be negative.
This prediction is based on the risk that arises from the customer-specic investments the rm
makes to serve their major customers. The e¤ects of these customer-specic investments should
be particularly notable for SG&A expenses. Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003) nd that
SG&A costs decrease less in response to falling sales than they increase with rising sales. They
explain this sticky-cost phenomenon by arguing that managers delay cost reduction in times
of weak demand if they expect demand to recover. We hypothesize that the nature of the rms
customer base a¤ects SG&A cost stickiness. If a rm makes customer-specic investments in selling,
general or administrative costs to capture operating e¢ ciencies that come with major-customer
relationships, then by denition these customer-specic investments are less transferable to other
uses than more general investments. Firms with high customer concentration would thus tend to
have a larger xed cost component in their SG&A expenses. If this contention is true, then the
elasticity of SG&A expenses with respect to sales should be lower the more concentrated the rms
customer base, as more inelastic SG&A expense reects a greater proportion of xed costs in the
rms cost structure.
The elasticity of SG&A expenses with respect to sales is the focus of a recent paper by Banker,
Byzalov and Plehn-Dujowich (2012). These authors focus on understanding how demand uncer-
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tainty a¤ects the rms cost structure. Their surprising conclusion is that higher demand uncer-
tainty is associated with a more rigid cost structure, with higher xed and lower variable costs.
They argue that this more rigid cost structure benets rms facing high demand uncertainty be-
cause adjusting to positive demand shocks is relatively expensive without the xed-cost structure
in place to handle this demand. Thus, the rm without a large SG&A xed-cost component cannot
easily capture the prot potential arising from positive demand shocks.
Building on the arguments in Anderson et al. (2003), and Banker et al. (2012), we predict
that customer concentration lowers the elasticity of SG&A expenses with respect to sales and that
customer concentration leads to greater demand uncertainty. A rm with high customer concentra-
tion is more exposed to idiosyncratic demand shocks generated by major customers. When major
customers receive their own demand shocks, they transfer this demand shock to their suppliers.
Thus, higher demand uncertainty could complement the tendency for rms with high customer
concentration to increase the xed-cost component of their SG&A expenses.2 Both cost-stickiness
and the demand uncertainty associated with customer concentration increase operating leverage.
Greater operating leverage increases the likelihood of nancial distress in low-demand states of the
world.
Anecdotally, young rms with a concentrated customer base are particularly at risk. The loss
of a major customer can impose signicant, often catastrophic, losses on a young rm. We test
this idea by examining the e¤ect of customer concentration on the probability of nancial distress.
We rst replicate the IPO failure regressions in Demers and Joos (2007) to test whether customer
concentration at the time of the IPO is a factor in determining whether a young rm encounters
nancial distress. In a more general setting, we replicate the Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008)
model of dynamic failure prediction. This test allows us to examine whether customer concentration
contributes to nancial distress across all rms, and it specically allows us to test if the impact
of customer concentration on the likelihood of rm failure changes with the age of the rm. Based
2Conversely, Matsen and Crocker (1985) suggest that take-or-pay contracts are sometimes used when the rm
produces much of its output for a major customer. Take-or-pay clauses require the customer to pay for a contractually
specied minimum quantity, even if delivery is not taken. Extensive use of take-or-pay contracts would reduce demand
uncertainty.
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on the analysis above, we predict that customer concentration should increase the likelihood of
nancial distress, but that this e¤ect should attenuate as the relationship matures.
3 Data
FASB accounting standards require all public companies to disclose the identities of their major
customers representing more than 10% of their total sales. We extract the identities of each rms
major customers from the Compustat Customer Segment Files. We focus on the period between
1977 and 2007. Compustat Customer Segment Files provide for each rm the names of its ma-
jor customers, revenue derived from sales to each major customer, and the type of each major
customer.3
For each rm we determine whether its customers are listed in the CRSP/Compustat universe.
If they are, then we assign them to the corresponding rms PERMNO. Since the focus in this
paper is on customer concentration and its impact on rmsoperating and nancial performance,
even when the customer rm cannot be assigned a PERMNO, we still keep the supplier-customer
link in the sample and identify the customer rm as a non CRSP/Compustat company.4
Following Patatoukas (2012), we construct our primary measure of customer concentration using
the following formula:
CCi;t =
nX
j=1

Sales to Customeri;j;t
Total Salesi;t
2
(1)
If rm i has n major customers in year t, the measure of customer concentration (CCi;t) of the
rm is dened as the sum of the squares of the sales shares to each major customer. The sales share
to each customer j in year t is calculated as the ratio of rm is sales to customer j in year t scaled
by rm is total sales in year t. Patatoukas (2012) constructs his customer concentration measure in
3The dataset groups customers into three broad categories based on their type: company(COMPANY), do-
mestic government(GOVDOM), and foreign government(GOVFRN). We exclude information on customers that
are identied as domestic or foreign governments, even if they may be major customers for a certain supplier rm.
4Cohen and Frazzini (2008) report that the Compustat Customer Segment les report the names of customer
companies but often fail to provide company identication codes such as customer rmsPERMNOs. For these
rms, we use a phonetic string matching algorithm to generate a list of potential matches to the customer name. We
then hand-match the customer to the corresponding PERMNO based on the rms name, segment, and SIC code.
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the spirit of the Herndahl-Hirschman index, and suggests that the measure captures two elements
of customer concentration: the number of major customers and the relative importance of each
major customer. By denition, the customer concentration (CC) is bounded between 0 and 1 as
CC is equal to 1 if the rm earns all of its revenue from a single customer and as the customer
base diversies CC tends to 0.
As in Patatoukas (2012), we exclude nancial services rms from the sample. Our sample
consists of all rms listed in the CRSP-Compustat database with non-negative book values of
equity, non-missing values of customer concentration (CC), market value of equity (MV ), annual
percentage sales growth (GROWTH), and accounting rates of return at the scal year-end when
we can identify major customers.5 After imposing these restrictions, we are left with 49,760 supplier
rm-year observations between 1977 and 2007.
Sample composition
Our sample di¤ers from the sample used in Patatoukas (2012). Patatoukas (2012) focuses on the
subsample of rm-year observations with positive operating margins, whereas we include rm-year
observations with operating losses. Of the 49,760 rm-year observations in our sample, 10,836 have
operating losses (21.8 percent). Excluding this signicant subset of the sample limits understand-
ing of the impact of customer concentration on rm protability. Furthermore, over a comparable
period we have signicantly more rm-year observations with positive operating margins (38,924)
than Patatoukas(2012) 25,389.6 To alleviate concerns regarding our sample, we repeat all analy-
ses using only the set of rm-year observations with positive operating margins and nd results
qualitatively similar to Patatoukas (2012).
5 Including rms with both negative earnings and negative book values confounds a direct interpretation of higher
ROE as a good outcome. We drop negative book value rms to avoid this confusion. In unreported analysis, we
include negative book value rms and nd consistent results.
6Hoechle, Schmid, Walter and Yermack (2012) report a temporary deletion of valid Compustat segment le
observations during 2007-2008. This problem, as well as periodic updates to the Compustat segment les, can
account for the di¤erence in sample sizes between our paper and Patatoukas (2012).
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3.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 presents the time series of average customer concentration from 1977 to 2007 as reported in
the Compustat customer segment les. We rst note that customer concentration exhibits a marked
increase from the early years of the sample through 1997, a period coincident with a general increase
in the number of listed rms. The number of rms reporting customer concentration fell from a
high of close to 3,500 in 1997 to what appears to be a steady state of just over 2,000 for the
2002-2007 period. Consistent with Patatoukas (2012), median customer concentration reveals a
generally increasing trend over time, from a low of 0.03 in 1977 and 1978 to a high of over 0.06 in
2007.
Table 1 lists our variable denitions, grouped into four categories: (i) Supplier-rm charac-
teristics, (ii) Customer-rm characteristics, (iii) IPO failure prediction variables that follow the
denitions in Demers and Joos (2007) for easy comparison of their results to our tests, and (iv)
Default prediction variables used in our extension of the Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008)
default prediction model. CC is the basic measure of customer concentration described in Equation
(1) and CC measures the year over year change in CC:
Table 2 presents summary statistics for several key variables for the full sample (Panel A), for
positive and negative protability subsamples (Panel B), and for mature versus young subsamples
(Panel C). The variables MV; AGE; and GROWTH dene the basic characteristics of supplier
rms. MV measures the rms market value of equity in millions of dollars, AGE is the rms age
in years, measured from the time of its Initial Public O¤ering (IPO). GROWTH is the supplier
rms annual sales growth rate.
ROA; ROE; and SGA; dene key operating characteristics of supplier rms. ROA is the
ratio of income before extraordinary items to the beginning of year book value of total assets for
the rm. ROE is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the beginning of year book
value of equity for the rm. SGA is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to
sales. IHLD is the ratio of inventory to the book value of total assets for the rm. TLMTA and
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CASHMTA are variables dened in Campbell et al. (2008) as total liabilities scaled by the market
value of total assets and rm cash holdings scaled by the market value of total assets, respectively.
Following Patatoukas (2012), we also include weighted averages of major customerscharacteristics.
Every year, each customer characteristic is weighed by the supplying rms percent of sales to that
customer relative to the their total revenues from all major customers. CMV is the weighted
average market value of equity for a rms major customers, in millions of dollars. CAGE is the
weighted average age of rmsmajor customers. CCSALES is the percentage of rm sales that go
to identiable major customers. CSG is the weighted average annual percentage sales growth for
a rms identiable major customers.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviation, skewness, median, 25th, and 75th
percentile values for the variables used in this study. On average, each supplier has 1.89 major
customers and generates 33 percent of its annual sales from these customers (CCSALES). CC
averages 10.1% for the 49,760 observations in the sample with a standard of deviation of 14.7%.
The latter statistic suggests that there is large cross-sectional variation in rmsdependence on
their major customers for revenues. Our sample is considerably larger than the restricted sample in
Patatoukas (2012), but mean CC is close to the mean in Patatoukas (2012). This fact shows that
any di¤ering results due to our expansion of the sample is not attributable to radical di¤erences in
customer concentration. Changes in customer concentration are also similar to those in Patatoukas
(2012). On average each rm accounts for only 2% of their customers cost of goods sold. While
these summary statistics are similar to Patatoukas (2012) and further verify the asymmetric relation
between suppliers and customers, our sample rms are younger and smaller than those in Patatoukas
(2012). Firms in our sample average only 10.3 years of age compared to 14.8 in Patatoukas (2012)
with a market cap of $806 million relative to Patatoukas(2012) $1,206 million. Because we do not
censor on protability, the average ROA and ROE are lower at -0.01 (Patatoukas (2012), 0.06)
and -0.03 (0.13), respectively. In only 6% of our sample do suppliers and customers operate in the
same 4-digit SIC industry.7 Three of our main dependent variables, ROA; ROE and SGA, and
7When we use the Fama-French (1997) 49 industry group classication model to identify a rms industry a¢ lia-
tion, we nd that 27% of supplier-customer relationships are between supplier rms and customer rms that operate
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the key explanatory variable, CC, are all signicantly skewed. In order to mitigate the e¤ect of
skewness, we use the decile rank of CC (CC) instead of CC (CC), as in Patatoukas (2012), in
our regression analyses.
Panel B of Table 2 separates the sample into positive and negative operating margin groups.
For each group, we report the mean, median, and standard deviation of key variables and report
the di¤erences in means across the two groups. Positive operating margin rms dominate the
composition of the sample by a ratio of almost 4:1. The di¤erences between these two groups are
striking and almost always statistically and economically signicant. Negative operating margin
(OM) rms have a mean customer concentration of 14.2%, compared to 9.0% for positive OM rms
(t-statistic of the di¤erence = -27.6). They are also younger, averaging only 7.3 years compared to
11.1 years for the positive OM subsample (t-statistic of the di¤erence = 48.6). Total liabilities to
market assets averages 0.30 for the negative OM rms and 0.36 for positive OM rms. Negative
OM rms have more cash to total assets (CASHMTA) at 0.17 relative to the 0.09 cash holdings
of positive OM rms. We note that by inspection positive OM rms have more debt and less
cash, but both types of rms have signicant debt in their capital structure and these high average
debt levels could lead to economically signicant distress risk. Firms that are not protable are,
on average, younger, smaller in size, and more reliant on their major customers for their revenues.
Furthermore, rms with negative operating margins have signicantly higher SG&A expenses as a
percentage of their sales than protable rms.
Motivated by the signicant di¤erence in rm age between positive and negative OM rms,
Panel C of Table 2 examines the characteristics of the sample rms by age. The median rm age
is 7, so we dene young rms as those that have been public for at most 7 years. This denition
splits the sample into two similar-sized groups of 24,628 mature rm-year observations and 25,132
young rm-year observations. The customer concentration measure (CC) is higher for young rms
(11.3%) relative to mature rms (8.9%), but the di¤erence is not as great as that between the
positive and negative OM subsamples. As expected, young rms are smaller than mature rms
in the same industry.
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and they are growing faster. Illustrating the connection between rm age and protability, young
rms are signicantly less protable than mature rms. Young rms have a mean ROA of -0.05 and
a mean ROE of -0.08 compared to the mean ROA of 0.02 and the mean ROE of 0.03 for mature
rms. These di¤erences are statistically signicant. Young rms have higher SG&A expenses than
mature rms, but relatively less debt and more cash. The latter facts indicate that there is nothing
about the average capital structure of young rms that renders them more likely to experience
nancial distress.
The statistically signicant di¤erences in the characteristics of customer concentration in both
Panels B and C are not strikingly large. The positive OM rms in Panel B have slightly larger and
older customers than those of the negative OM rms. Positive OM rms have customers that are
growing slightly faster; averaging 12% for positive OM rms relative to 10% for negative OM rms.
In Panel C, the mature rms have, not surprisingly, somewhat larger and older customers, but the
young rmscustomers are growing marginally faster; 12% for the young rms relative to 11% for
the mature rms.
In the rest of the paper we try to understand the di¤erences between rms with positive oper-
ating margins and rms with negative operating margins and determine whether rm age is a key
driver of these di¤erences. Furthermore we analyze the impact of customer concentration on rm
protability for the full sample of rms.
4 Results
4.1 Customer concentration and rm performance
4.1.1 Correlation Analysis
Table 3 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations across the full sample (Panel A), the positive
operating margin subsample (Panel B) and the negative operating margin subsample (Panel C).
By analyzing these correlations, we can get an initial idea of how the relation between customer
concentration and rm protability depends on the sign of operating protability. In the full
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sample, customer concentration is negatively related to ROA and ROE with correlation coe¢ cients
of -0.11 and -0.08, respectively. In the positive OM subsample, the correlations are positive for
ROA at 0.03 and ROE at 0.01. In the negative OM subsample, the signs of these correlations
reverse. Here, the correlation between customer concentration and ROA is -0.07 and -0.02 for
ROE.8 The correlation between customer concentration and SGA, a key measure of operating
e¢ ciency in Patatoukas (2012), is positive in the full sample, indicating that customer concentration
is not generally associated with cost savings. Nevertheless, in the positive OM subsample, the
correlations are negative (-0.04), consistent with the ndings in Patatoukas (2012). In the negative
OM subsample, the sign of the correlation is reversed and relatively large at 0.23. Customer
concentration is negatively correlated with rm age in all three panels, supporting the inference
from Table 2 Panel B, that younger rms tend to have higher customer concentration.
Why is the e¤ect of customer concentration so di¤erent across positive and negative OM rms?
We illustrate how rm protability varies by customer concentration and rm age in Figure 2.
Panel A of Figure 2 shows the non-linear U-shaped relation between customer concentration and
protability. The lowest protability rms have high customer concentration and as protability
increases customer concentration declines. As protability continues to climb customer concentra-
tion increases again. We identify graphically how the exclusion of the lowest protability rms
likely masks the non-linear relation between customer concentration and protability. Figure 2
also identies how the lowest protability deciles tend to be younger rms. Protability generally
increases in rm age until it turns down again in the highest protability deciles.
These initial ndings are consistent with our dynamic life-cycle hypothesis about how customer
concentration relates to rm protability over the life of the rm. We conrm Patatoukas(2012)
surprising result that customer concentration can be positively related to protability and that
operating e¢ ciencies associated with customer concentration are a plausible cause for the increased
protability in already protable rms. Despite these potential e¢ ciencies, we contend that newly-
8Note that the skewed distribution of CC can cause the subsample correlations to fail to bracket the full sample
correlation, an illustration of Simpsons paradox.
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public rms face signicant risks from customer concentration. For young rms, a concentrated
customer base is costly and only as the relationship matures does it lead to operating e¢ ciencies
that signicantly improve protability. The cost structure facing young rms can lead to greater
probabilities of nancial distress and delisting, a contention we investigate below.
4.1.2 Sorting on customer concentration and rm age
To test our hypothesis on the dynamic nature of customer concentration and its e¤ects on rms
operating e¢ ciency, we rst do a simple sorting procedure presented in Table 4. We rst separate
the sample into two groups, and analyze the full sample in Panel A and just the rms with positive
operating margins (as in Patatoukas (2012)) in Panel B. Then for each panel we sort the rms into
young and mature rms using the median age of 7 years reported earlier as our breakpoint. We
then sort young and mature rms into quintiles based on customer concentration and examine the
means and medians of the key operating variables, ROE; ROA; and SGA across the quintiles.
For the full sample in Panel A we see a marked di¤erence in operating performance across
customer concentration quintiles. ROA and ROE monotonically decline as customer concentration
increases. This pattern is particularly strong for young rms. In the lowest customer concentration
quintile ROA is -0.68% for young rms but ROA declines to -8.86% for young rms in the highest
customer concentration quintile. A similar pattern is observed for ROE; as ROE monotonically
declines from -0.53% in the lowest customer concentration quintile to -14.4% in the highest quintile.
SG&A expenses as a percentage of sales monotonically increase with customer concentration from
37.9% in the lowest CC quintile to 69.4% in the highest. Similar patterns are observed for the
mature rms in the full sample, but these rms tend to be protable, particularly in the low
customer concentration quintiles. For mature rms SG&A expenses also increase with customer
concentration from 26.1% in the lowest CC quintile to 37.1% in the highest quintile. In the full
sample, particularly for young rms, customer concentration is related to higher SG&A expenses
and lower protability.
This pattern of customer concentration leading to deteriorating operating performance is masked
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when we only look at the young rms with positive operating performance in Panel B. For young
rms with positive operating performance, ROE and ROA show no overall pattern in customer
concentration, though protability of the highest customer concentration quintile is higher than
that of the lowest customer concentration quintile. Consistent with Patatoukas (2012) results
we nd that SG&A expenses decline with customer concentration for protable rms. However,
analyzing only the protable rms introduces an endogeneity bias; as the mere fact that these rms
are protable could simply mean that they do not face signicant adverse e¤ects from customer
concentration. In general, the e¤ects of customer concentration are smaller for mature rms than
they are for young rms, but the di¤erent patterns between the full sample and the positive OM
subsample illustrate how examining only positive OM rms is incomplete and inferences about
positive OM rms dont apply to negative OM rms.
The di¤erent patterns across positive and negative OM samples is outlined in the graphs in
Figure 3. Figure 3 graphs ROA in two dimensions: by CC quintile and AGE quintile. In the full
sample in Panel A, protability is clearly higher for all rm ages in the lowest customer concentra-
tion quintile, and much lower for young rms that have the highest customer concentration. In the
positive OM subsample graph presented in Panel B, the protability di¤erences are much smaller
across both AGE and CC quintiles, and ROA is marginally higher in the highest CC quintile in
four of ve AGE quintiles.
4.1.3 Regression Analyses
We verify the net e¤ect of customer concentration on protability and costs in Table 5 which
presents the average coe¢ cients of Fama-MacBeth regressions using six rm operating character-
istics as the dependent variables. Following Patatoukas (2012) the independent variables we use
are customer concentration rank Rank(CC) and control variables for market value (MV ), rm age
(AGE), sales growth (GROWTH), an indicator variable for rms having more than one line of
business (CONGLO), and nancial leverage (FLEV ). The full sample results in Panel A show
that inclusion of negative operating margin rms has a profound e¤ect on the empirical evidence
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about the relation between customer concentration and rm operations. Unlike Patatoukas(2012,
373) results, customer concentration is negatively related to both ROA and ROE in the full sample.
Customer concentration is also negatively related to asset turnover (ATO) and positively related
to SG&A expenses. These results show how Patatoukas(2012) results do not generalize to rms
with operating losses and illustrate that the endogeneity of protability can mask the full e¤ect of
customer concentration on rm protability.
Panel B of Table 5 presents the same analysis for protable rms only. For these rms and using
the same set of control variables, we generally can conrm many of the ndings in Patatoukas (2012).
Customer concentration is positively related to ROA and ROE as well as prot margin (PM), but
we do not conrm, in our larger sample of positive OM rms, that customer concentration has
benecial e¤ects on asset turnover. In line with Patatoukas (2012) and arguments on the impact
of customer power in Kelly and Gosman (2000), we nd that suppliers with more concentrated
customer bases report signicantly lower gross margins. Patatoukas (2012) argues that the negative
e¤ects on gross margins can be o¤set if high CC rms spend less on SG&A expenses. As in
Patatoukas (2012) we nd this o¤setting e¤ect exists in this subsample. Positive operating margin
rms with higher customer concentration tend to spend signicantly less on SG&A expenses.
When we examine rms with negative operating margins in Panel C of Table 5, we can see
that the relation between customer concentration and rm operating characteristics is markedly
di¤erent than it is for rms with positive operating margins. In Panel C, we nd that customer
concentration has a negative e¤ect on ROE; ROA; and prot margins (PM). Unlike the results
for positive operating margin rms in Panel B, the negative impact of customer concentration on
gross margins is not o¤set by lower SG&A expenses. In the SGA regression reported in Column 8,
the coe¢ cient on customer concentration is signicantly positive.
To summarize, we expand upon one of the main tables in Patatoukas (2012, Table 2, Panel A) in
Table 5. While we nd generally consistent results regarding the e¤ects of customer concentration
in the subsample of positive operating margin rms, we nd contrary results in the subsample
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of rms with negative operating margins. Furthermore, the coe¢ cients on the rank of customer
concentration in the negative operating margin subsample are larger in magnitude and of the
opposite sign to those in the subsample of positive operating margin rms. When we decompose
the sample by rm age in Panels D and E we nd results that are generally consistent with our
contention that removing negative operating margin rms from the full sample tends to lter
the sample by rm age. In Panel E, we nd that customer concentration adversely a¤ects the
protability of young rms. Customer concentration is negatively related to ROA and ROE and
positively related to SG&A expenses for young rms. For mature rms (Panel D) the e¤ects of
customer concentration on ROA; ROE and SGA are insignicant. The adverse e¤ects of customer
concentration on young rms tend to dominate the full sample estimates. We specically examine
the e¤ects of customer concentration and nancial distress for young rms below in Section 4.3.1.
4.1.4 Changes in Customer Concentration
To test the causal relation between customer concentration and operating characteristics, we regress
changes in ROA and SGA on changes in customer concentration and the set of control variables in
Patatoukas (2012). These results are presented in Table 6. As in Patatoukas (2012) we calculate the
e¤ects of changes in the rank of customer concentration to better dene the direction of causality
between customer concentration and rm operating characteristics. Patatoukas (2012) nds that
changes in customer concentration, Rank(CC); have a signicantly positive e¤ect on changes in
ROA (ROA); and a signicantly negative e¤ect on changes in SG&A expenses (SGA) for rms
with positive operating margins.9 Panel A of Table 6 estimates regressions using our full sample
and nds results that contradict those in Patatoukas (2012). Specically, changes in customer con-
centration rank are signicantly negatively related to changes in ROA and signicantly positively
related to changes in SG&A expenses. These results generally conrm the contentions that we
derive on customer concentration and rm performance from the static analysis in Tables 4 and 5.
9Patatoukas (2012) also nds a positive relation between changes in customer concentration and changes in ROE.
We do not include ROE changes as the specication in Patatoukas (2012) contains no leverage control. When we
estimate the Table 6 regressions for changes in ROE with a leverage control variable, the coe¢ cients on changes in
customer concentration are insignicantly negative.
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We next support our ideas on the life-cycle e¤ects of customer concentration on rm performance
by splitting the sample into young and mature rms and examining the two subsamples separately.
First, in Panel B, we examine the young rms in the sample and nd causal results similar to
those in the full sample. Rank(CC) adversely impacts future operating performance (ROA)
for young rms. The evidence suggests that one of the major drivers of this deteriorating operating
performance is an increase in SG&A expenses. We suggest, and in the next section provide evidence
that, Patatoukas (2012) is correct in that eventually in the life-cycle of the rm, operating e¢ ciencies
can be achieved from customer concentration. However, these gains do not seem to be as direct
as those illustrated in Patatoukas(2012) sample. In particular, young rms seem to face greater
costs adjusting to a concentrated customer base. The coe¢ cients of Rank(CC) for mature rms
(Panel C) are statistically insignicant. Thus, we do not claim that the negative e¤ects of customer
concentration on rm performance are universal across all rms. Rather, as illustrated by the size
of the coe¢ cients on the variable Rank(CC) in Panel B, the e¤ects seem to be concentrated in
younger rms.
The results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 show that customer concentration doesnt always improve
rm performance. Rather, customer concentration adversely impacts rm operating performance
in the full sample. Our results suggest that the negative impact of customer concentration on
rm performance manifests itself most severely on rms with negative operating margins and on
younger rms.
4.2 Customer concentration and rm cost structure
4.2.1 Operating performance of young rms
To better understand how customer concentration a¤ects the operations of young rms, we repli-
cate another Patatoukas (2012) test and examine the e¤ect of customer concentration on specic
operating e¢ ciency measures. Panel A of Table 7 examines the e¤ect of customer concentration
on young rmsinventory, asset turnover components, advertising, and SG&A expenses while con-
trolling for rm size, age, sales growth, lines of business and nancial leverage. In Panel A, we nd
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that Patatoukas(2012) conclusions about operating e¢ ciency are generally correct. Having large
and important customers allows suppliers to reduce inventory holding costs (IHLD) and improve
inventory turnover. The ties that develop between the rm and its major customers allow the rm
to e¤ectively manage its inventory. This nding still leaves the rm susceptible to an undiversied
customer base, in that lower demand from major customers may not be o¤set by countervailing
increases in demand from other customers. However, it does suggest that once an order from a
major customer has been received, the rm can fulll the order relatively e¢ ciently. With the
exception of cash turnover, the other components of asset turnover are either consistent with the
contention that customer concentration improves operating e¢ ciency or insignicant. However,
customer concentration has a signicantly negative e¤ect on cash turnover.10
We also nd, consistent with Patatoukas (2012), that young rmsadvertising expenses as a
percentage of sales are negatively related to customer concentration. Although a relatively small
component of rm costs, examining the e¤ects of customer concentration on advertising expenses
is interesting because the argument is so intuitive. Having developed a relationship with major
customers, it makes sense that the rm spends relatively less trying to attract new customers.
However, the reduction in advertising expenses is not the driver of the customer concentration 
SG&A expense relation. Patatoukas (2012) nds, as we do, advertising expense is too small to
explain the customer concentration SG&A expense relation in his sample of positive operating
margin rms. While we agree that advertising costs are relatively unimportant, we add a speci-
cation using SGA as the dependent variable to highlight the fact that the customer concentration
SG&A expense relation is very di¤erent for young rms than it is for positive operating margin
rms. Customer concentration can help elements of young rmsoperations, but having a concen-
trated customer base results in signicantly higher costs for these rms, a nding that we explore
in more detail below.
In Panel B of Table 7 we examine the e¤ect of customer concentration on young rmscash
10 In unreported results we nd that cash holdings increase with customer-base concentration. This nding is
consistent with high customer concentration rms holding higher precautionary cash balances, which impairs their
cash turnover.
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management and receivables. We construct this analysis to show how some of the conclusions in
Patatoukas (2012) do generalize to younger, less protable rms, yet others do not. We examine the
e¤ects of customer concentration on the ratio of accounts receivable to sales (DAY S_RCV BLE),
the ratio of accounts payable to cost of goods sold (DAY S_PAY ABLE), the ratio of inventory
to cost of goods sold (DAY S_INV T ), the total of the cash conversion elements measured as
receivables less payables plus inventory (TOTCY CLE), and the provision for doubtful accounts
relative to accounts receivable (DOUBTFUL). We nd that customer concentration increases days
receivable, increases days payable, and is not signicantly related to days of inventory. Overall, the
e¤ects of customer concentration on young rmscash management components are di¤erent from
those in Patatoukas(2012) sample of positive operating margin rms. However, the total e¤ect
(TOTCY CLE) is negative, consistent with Patatoukas (2012). We also nd that doing business
with large customers reduces the provision for doubtful accounts.
Our examination of specic components of young rmsoperating performance often produces
results that are consistent with the surprising ndings in Patatoukas (2012), that customer concen-
tration can lead to operating e¢ ciencies. Despite the overall adverse e¤ects of customer concentra-
tion on young rms, we nd that young rms accrue certain benets from their relationships with
major customers, particularly in their working capital management. Nevertheless, we nd that
customer concentration so adversely a¤ects SG&A expenses, an important component of operating
expenses, that neither the reductions in advertising costs nor the improvements in working capital
management o¤set the high SG&A expenses that come with customer concentration. We next pro-
ceed to examine the e¤ects of customer concentration on the economics of the major components
of rm costs below.
4.2.2 Elasticity of operating expenses, operating leverage, and demand uncertainty
In Section 2 we develop contentions regarding how a rms customer base a¤ects its cost structure,
particularly, given the focus on operating e¢ ciency, on the patterns of cost-stickiness in SG&A
expenses. We show in Panel A of Table 8 how operating expenses break down for the average
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rm in our sample. Cost of goods sold average 64.4% of sales and SG&A expenses average 39.1%.
As a component of SG&A expenses, advertising expense averages only 1.0% of sales. This gure
indicates why the improvements in advertising expenses customer concentration allows do not
necessarily translate into operating protability.
Panel B of Table 8 examines the elasticity with respect to sales for the two major components
of rm operating costs, cost of goods sold and SG&A expenses, across ve di¤erent quintiles of
customer concentration. Our examination of cost elasticity is derived from the cost-stickiness
arguments of Anderson et al. (2003) and Baumgarten, Bonenkamp and Homburg (2010). Cost
elasticity with respect to sales measures the percentage variation in costs relative to percentage
variation in rm sales. We nd that for all rms, costs are inelastic, varying less than one-to-one
with sales variation. We also nd a distinct pattern in cost elasticity: the higher a rms customer
concentration, the lower its cost elasticity. The di¤erences are signicant across the concentration
quintiles, and particularly dramatic for SG&A elasticity. All SG&A costs are sticky in the sense
that they are inelastic and thus tend to be less variable than rm sales. SG&A cost elasticity is
0.79 for rms in the lowest customer concentration quintile falling to 0.56 in the highest customer
concentration quintile. Economically, we infer from this data that rms with higher customer
concentration make greater investments in customer-specic SG&A expenses. They do this to
capture the potential operating e¢ ciencies documented in Section 4.2.1. Such investments allow
rms to more easily expand their operations when major customers increase their demand (Banker
et al. 2012). However, when demand falls, these customer-specic investments are less transferable
to other customers than more general costs.
We contend that high customer concentration rms make customer-specic investments that
can lead to greater operating protability should the relationship succeed. However, such rms
may face greater risks should sales to major customers decline. To understand how sales risk varies
with customer concentration we examine demand uncertainty. Banker et al. (2012) postulate that
demand uncertainty, measured by the volatility of sales, can lead to lower cost elasticity. They argue
that rms facing high demand uncertainty make greater xed-cost investments in order to capitalize
24
in high-demand states. Firms that do not make such investments would, due to high short-term
adjustment costs, not be able to capitalize on the high prots available in high demand states.
Their arguments would dovetail into our ndings on cost elasticity and customer concentration if
demand uncertainty increases with customer concentration.
When we examine demand uncertainty across customer concentration quintiles in Panel C of
Table 8, we nd that demand uncertainty signicantly increases from the lowest customer concen-
tration quintile (0.19) to the highest customer concentration quintile (0.32). If one considers rm
sales in a portfolio context, then this nding makes sense. Firms with a few major customers are
relatively undiversied in sales and thus, customer-specic demand shocks are more likely to impact
sales compared to the impact of customer-specic demand shocks on the revenues of rms with
diversied customer bases. The monotonically increasing relation we nd between customer concen-
tration and demand uncertainty complements the arguments of both Patatoukas (2012) and Banker
et al. (2012). If the rm major customer relationship encourages rms to make customer-specic
investments, they will have more inelastic cost structures and potentially higher prots should the
relationship succeed. However, the higher xed costs for rms with concentrated customer bases
could also lead to a greater probability of nancial distress for these rms. We investigate this issue
in our nal empirical tests below.
4.3 Customer concentration and rm failure
Having observed that customer concentration in young, unprotable rms implies that such rms
have higher demand uncertainty and lower cost elasticity, we next investigate the relation between
customer concentration (CC) and probability of failure at di¤erent stages of a rms life. For
this purpose we conduct two types of analyses, both follow established methods to highlight the
incremental power of customer concentration to explain nancial distress. Section 4.3.1 replicates
the IPO failure model of Demers and Joos (2007) while Section 4.3.2 replicates the rm failure
model of Campbell et al. (2008).
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4.3.1 IPO failure
Earlier we speculate that customer concentration could be risky for young rms. In this section we
support this contention by analyzing whether our measure of customer concentration Rank(CC)
is related to the probability of rm failure. Our rst test is a replication of the determinants of
IPO failure procedure in Demers and Joos (2007). To estimate the failure probability for IPOs, we
use the 1980-2000 data from Demers and Joos (2007) and calculate the probability of failure for
2,431 IPOs over the next 5 years (to match the Demers and Joos (2007) framework) and the next 7
years (to correspond to our denition of young rms). To do this we use the same CRSP delisting
classication codes used in their paper. Therefore, the dependent variable in Table 9 is a discrete
dependent variable that takes on a value of 1 if the IPO fails within 5 or 7 years after the rm goes
public.
We then merge the Demers and Joos (2007) data with our customer concentration data. Because
not all rms in the Demers and Joos (2007) sample have customer concentration data, our sample is
smaller than that in Demers and Joos (2007) consisting of 2,431 rms with customer concentration
data relative to their 3,574 rms. By extending the denition of IPO failure by an additional two
years, we nd that a total of 415 rms in our sample fail within 7 years after their IPO, compared
to 292 that fail within 5 years of going public. Our 7 year failure rate is 2.44% per year, slightly
lower than the annual failure rate of 2.70% in Demers and Joos (2007).
Demers and Joos (2007) dene failure using the CRSP delisting codes for liquidation (400) and
delistings (500) with exclusions for rms that switch exchanges (501) or delist at the rms request
(503). IPO failure is thus dened as rm liquidation or involuntary failure to maintain a listing.
Besides default, failure to maintain listing could occur for several reasons including deciencies in
market maker participation or the number of shareholders. The price of the issue could also fall
below the exchange minimum or the rm could be delisted because it is delinquent in ling required
documents or paying exchange fees.
Following Demers and Joos (2007), the variables we use for static IPO failure prediction
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are the following: UNDERWRITER is the Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation ranking.
INC_AGE is the natural log of the age of the rm measured from the date of incorporation. We
use age from incorporation in this analysis, rather than AGE of the rm as a public entity to con-
form with the denitions in Demers and Joos (2007).11 V C is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if
the rm is venture-capital-backed at the time of IPO. AUDITOR is an indicator variable set equal
to 1 if the rm has a Big 8 or a national rm auditor. IPO_MARKET is the average initial return
to all IPOs in the 90 days prior to the rms IPO. FIRSTDAY RET is the rst-day initial return:
closing price on the IPO date less o¤er price as percentage of the o¤er price. OFFERPRICE is
the CPI-adjusted IPO o¤er price. IPO_LEV is equal to total liabilities divided by the sum of total
assets plus the proceeds raised at the date of IPO. RD is the natural log of one plus R&D expense
at the time of IPO. LSGA is the natural log of selling, general, and administrative expenses at the
time of IPO. GM is the gross margin ratio at the time of IPO. DEFICIT is the negative log of
retained earnings if the rm is in a decit position, 0 otherwise. SALES is the natural log of one
plus sales at the time of IPO.
A hypothesis of this paper is that young rms, such as recently-public IPOs, face greater
risk from customer concentration than more mature rms. In Table 7 we show that customer
concentration can, in some ways, improve the operating e¢ ciency of the rm. However, this
operating e¢ ciency improvement comes at the cost of greater customer-specic investments. These
investments, by denition, are less transferable to other customers should the relationship with
a major customer fail. This risk could result in the liquidation or delisting of the rm due to
nancial distress. Thus, we contend that young rms face a trade-o¤ between the e¢ ciency gains
that can arise from customer concentration and a higher likelihood of nancial distress. To test
this contention, we replicate the Demers and Joos (2007) failure prediction model.
Table 9 presents the logistic estimation of IPO failure risk. We regress the qualitative variable
for IPO failure over the next 5 and 7 years against the set of Demers and Joos (2007) predictive
11Their choice is undoubtedly driven by the fact that, as all IPOs start as newly-public rms, AGE does not vary
across rms.
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variables in Columns (1) and (3). Within our subsample we nd results that are consistent with
Demers and Joos (2007) who nd that research and development expenses and sales are signi-
cantly negatively related to IPO failure. In addition, leverage and SG&A expenses are positively
related to the probability of failure. The nding that failure is positively related to SG&A expenses
is signicant given our evidence that customer concentration in young rms is related to higher
customer-specic SG&A expenses. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 9 include our measure of cus-
tomer concentration, Rank(CC); as a regressor. Customer concentration is signicantly positively
related to the probability that an IPO rm fails over the next 5 and 7 years. Thus, the disclosure
of customer information is useful in predicting rm distress risk. Young rms with higher cus-
tomer concentration are more likely to face nancial distress, a result we attribute to the greater
customer-specic investments made by these rms. Note that both the coe¢ cient size and sta-
tistical signicance of Rank(CC) is less in the 7 year regression compared to the 5 year failure
prediction regression. This nding is consistent with our conjecture that customer concentration is
particularly risky for young rms, but as the relationship matures, the relationship can yield the
operational e¢ ciencies documented in Patatoukas (2012).
4.3.2 Broad failure
The analysis in Table 9 is a static analysis that predicts only if an IPO eventually fails over the
next 5 or 7 years. We can get a better idea of the impact of customer concentration on failure
risk by analyzing our full sample on a year-by-year basis. To accomplish this we run a dynamic
model predicting rm failure for all rms over the period between 1980 and 2007. The dependent
variable is the dichotomous outcome variable: rm failure or no failure in a particular rm-year.
To predict failure we start with the framework in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) who
use nancial and market variables to predict default. We use their nomenclature for the set of
predictive variables: total liabilities to the market value of assets (TLMTA); net income to market
value of assets (NIMTA); the standard deviation of stock returns over the previous three months
(SIGMA); market to book ratio (MB), relative size of the rm as measured by the log of the
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market value of the rm relative to the log of market value of the S&P 500 Index (RSIZE); the
ratio of rm cash holdings to the market value of total assets (CASHMTA); and the prior months
stock returns relative to the S&P 500 Index returns over the same time period (EXRET ):12
Campbell et al. (2008) nd that this set of independent variables is able to predict default. We
examine this nding for our sample in Column (1) of Table 10. In this specication, we use the
independent variables proposed by Campbell et al. (2008) to estimate the failure probability for
48,948 rm-year observations. For our sample of rms with customer concentration data, we nd
results that conrm the Campbell et al. (2008) model of failure predictability. The model has a
psuedo-R2 of 20.9% and all of the independent variables are signicant with the expected sign.
In Column (2) of Table 10 we add the measure of customer concentration, Rank(CC); to the
regression. In Column (3) of Table 10 we include the interaction variable AGE  Rank(CC) to
test our contention that if a young rm survives, it can successfully manage the relationship with
major customers, eventually improving operating performance and lowering failure risk.
We nd signicant results from including the customer concentration variables. The coe¢ cient
on Rank(CC) in Column (2) is positive and signicant. This result demonstrates that customer
concentration captures failure-related information that is not already reected in the existing pre-
dictors of rm failure. In Column (3) we nd that increasing customer concentration signicantly
increases the risk of failure for all rms, but that this e¤ect declines as the rm ages. Column
(4) estimates the e¤ects of the customer concentration variables without using the Campbell et al.
(2008) control variables to demonstrate that interactions between customer concentration and the
control variables are not driving our conclusions.
Overall, the results in Tables 9 and 10 support our hypothesis that the relation between customer
concentration and rm protability is dynamic and entails signicant failure risk for young rms.
Young rms with higher customer concentration exhibit weaker operating performance and incur
12All nancial variables are observable 12 months prior to the failure event to avoid endogenous relations being
recorded between the predictive variables and the failure event.
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a signicant increase in failure risk. However, if the rm survives these risky early years then,
consistent with Patatoukas (2012), customer concentration can improve the rms operations. To
fully understand the e¤ects of customer concentration on rm operations, we need to recognize that
observing only rms with positive operating margins, censors many younger rms that are not yet
protable and face signicant failure risk from customer concentration.
5 Conclusion
All supplier rms face the dilemma of whether to cater to a few dominant customers or whether
to seek a more diversied customer base. A long line of research dating back to Galbraith (1952)
suggests that major customers are threats to rmsoperating prots because, as important cus-
tomers with signicant bargaining power, they can demand price discounts and other concessions
from suppliers. In a recent study, Patatoukas (2012) challenges this view. Rather than looking at
industry-level concentration, as in previous studies, he creates a rm-specic measure of customer
concentration and nds that protable rms with high customer concentration benet from the
customer-specic investments they have undertaken through improved operating e¢ ciencies and
reduced SG&A expenses.
In this paper we use a recently expanded data set of sales to major customers to study the
economics of supplier rms. By examining all such rms, whether protable or not, we outline
a dynamic life-cycle hypothesis wherein young unprotable rms face considerable protability
and nancial distress risks from their relationships with their major customers. However, if the
relationship survives, these rms can eventually benet from some of the operating e¢ ciencies
documented in Patatoukas (2012). We nd that in the subsample of rms with positive operating
margins, the correlation between ROA and customer concentration is positive, while the correlation
between SG&A expenses and customer concentration is negative. However, in the subsample of
rms with negative operating margins the relations reverse as the correlation between ROA and
customer concentration is negative, while the correlation between SG&A expenses and customer
concentration is positive. The adverse impact of customer concentration on prots is particularly
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dramatic for young rms, who tend to be less protable. The exclusion of rms with negative
operating margins from an analysis investigating the impact of customer concentration on the
operations of rms thus introduces a bias. Firms with positive operating margins appear to be the
set of rms where customer concentration e¤ects are benign or favorable, while the adverse e¤ects
of customer concentration are strongly evident in young and unprotable rms.
We nd that many of the operational e¢ ciencies documented in Patatoukas (2012) exist, even
for young rms, but these benets are outweighed by the negative impact of customer concentration
on SG&A expenses. We conjecture that young rms with major customers make customer-specic
investments, particularly in SG&A expenses, and these customer-specic investments are harder
to transfer to other customers should the customer-supplier relationship deteriorate. We nd that
rms with higher customer concentration have more inelastic SG&A expenses and costs of goods
sold, a nding which supports our conjecture regarding customer-specic investments.
Firms with higher customer concentration also face greater demand uncertainty as they are
more exposed to idiosyncratic demand shocks from their major customers. Banker et al. (2012)
theorize that rms facing higher demand uncertainty will make investments that enable them to
make greater prots during high demand states of the world. However, these investments are harder
to transfer to alternative customers, and though they can produce operating e¢ ciencies should the
relationship be successful, we nd that they can increase the risk of nancial distress, particularly
for young rms. As the relationship between young rms and major customers successfully matures,
these risks diminish and greater operating e¢ ciencies have the potential to be realized.
Customer concentration gives rise to customer-specic investments that cause costs to be
stickyor inelastic, increasing operating leverage. This operating leverage e¤ect enhances prof-
itability in protable periods while increasing the rms losses in unprotable periods, consequently
increases the risk of nancial distress. Customer concentration brings both costs and benets to the
rm. Identifying these costs, by analyzing the full range of rm protability, allows us to reconcile
the conventional wisdom with Patatoukas(2012) results.
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Table 1 describes the main variables used in this study.  Supplier and customer firm characteristics are defined as in Patatoukas 
(2012). The customer-base concentration variable (CC) measures the extent to which a firm’s customer base is more or less 
concentrated. In addition to describing supplier firms’ characteristics we also summarize their major customers’ firm level 
attributes. In order to do so, we calculate weighted averages of the respective characteristics for each supplier firm’s major 
customers, using sales shares as the weights. CMV is the weighted-average market value of identifiable major customers, 
CAGE is the weighted-average age of a supplier’s major customers and CSG is the weighted-average sales growth of 
identifiable major customers. Supplier-customer relationships are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Customer Segment files. 
Market equity prices, accounting profitability measures and other financial statement items are from the CSRP-COMPUSTAT 
merged database. In this paper we also run two sets of failure prediction regressions. In Table 9, we replicate Demers and Joos 
(2007) to assess the impact of customer base concentration on IPO failure. Variables used in predicting IPO failures with the 
Demers and Joos (2007) logistic model are defined as in Demers and Joos (2007). In Table 10, we run dynamic logistic 
regressions as in Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) (hereafter CHS (2008)). Variables used in predicting firm failures 
with the dynamic CHS (2008) failure model are defined as in CHS (2008). 
    
Variable Definition 
Supplier Firm Characteristics as defined in Patatoukas (2012) 
CC Customer-base concentration measure  (0 ≤ CC ≤ 1)  
ΔCC Annual change in CC  
MV Market value of equity  
AGE Firm age of the supplier firm, measured from the time of the firm’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
GROWTH Annual sales growth  
ROA Income before extraordinary items / Beginning of year book value of assets  
ROE Income before extraordinary items / Beginning of year book value of equity  
SGA Selling, general, and administrative expenses / Sales  
GM Gross margin of the supplier firm: (Sales - Cost of goods sold) / Sales 
PM Profit margin of the supplier firm: Income before extraordinary items / Sales 
IHLD Inventory / Beginning of year book value of assets  
ATO Asset turnover of the supplier firm: Sales / Beginning of year book value of assets 
FLEV Beginning of year book value of assets / Beginning of year book value of equity 
CONGLO An indicator variable equal to 1 if the supplier firm reports at least two business segments 
  
Customer Firm Characteristics as defined in Patatoukas (2012) 
CMV Weighted average market value of equity of identifiable customers 
CAGE Weighted average firm age of identifiable customers 
CCSALES Sales to major customers / Total sales of the supplier firm 
CSG Weighted average annual sales growth of identifiable customers 
  
Default Prediction Variables Used in Table 9, as defined in Demers and Joos (2007) 
RANK(CC) Decile rank of the firm at the time of its IPO based on the customer-base concentration score 
VC An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is venture capital backed 
UNDERWRITER Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation ranking 
AUDITOR An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has Big 8 or a national firm auditor, 0 otherwise 
IPO_MARKET Initial return to all IPOs in the 90 days prior to the firm’s IPO 
OFFERPRICE Inflation-adjusted IPO offer price 
FIRSTDAYRET First-day initial return: closing price on the IPO date less offer price as % of offer price 
INC_AGE Natural log of one plus the firm age, where firm age is measured from the time of incorporation  
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RD Natural log of one plus R&D expense 
LSGA Natural log of selling, general, and administrative expenses 
DEFICIT Negative natural log of retained earnings if the firm is in a deficit position, 0 otherwise 
SALES Natural log of (1+Sales) 
IPO_LEV Total liabilities / (Total assets + the proceeds raised at the time of IPO) 
  
Default Prediction Variables Used in Table 10, as defined in Campbell Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008)  
TLMTA Total liabilities / Market value of total assets* 
CASHMTA Cash and short-term assets / Market value of total assets* 
SIGMA Standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns over the past 3 months 
MB Market-to-Book ratio  
RSIZE Log ratio of market capitalization to S&P 500 index 
PRICE Log price per share 
EXRET Monthly log excess return on equity relative to S&P 500 index 
 
*We follow CHS (2008) and adjust the market value of total assets. Adjusted market value of total assets is equal to the book value 
of total assets as measured in Compustat quarterly (data item: ATQ) plus ten percent of the difference between the market and book 
values of equity. The procedure increases total asset values that are extremely small and are likely mismeasured. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviation, skewness, median, 25th percentile, and 75thpercentile values of the main variables 
used in this study. MV and CMV are in millions of US dollars while AGE and CAGE are in years. The descriptive statistics are 
based on the sample used in the regression analyses. Our sample includes firms from 1977 to 2007. We only include non-
financial firms which have non-missing customer-base concentration measures, non-missing accounting profitability measures, 
and non-negative book values of equity. Panel A describes our full sample of 49,760 supplier firm year observations. Panel B 
divides the full sample into two groups: supplier firm year observations with positive operating margins and supplier firm year 
observations with negative operating margins. The mean differences between the two groups and the corresponding t-statistics 
are reported on the right-hand side of Panel B. Panel C divides the full sample into two groups: supplier firm year observations 
where the firm age is less than or equal to seven years and supplier firm year observations where the firm age is greater than 
seven years. The mean differences between the two groups and the corresponding t-statistics are reported on the right-hand side 
of Panel C. 
 
 
                
Panel A: Full sample       
        
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 25th Percent. Median 
75th 
Percent. 
CC 49,760  0.101  0.147  2.930  0.014  0.046  0.125  
ΔCC 43,048  -0.003  0.094  -0.534  -0.018  0.000  0.015  
MV 49,335  805.6  3,886.7  12.0  16.5 65.7  318.6  
AGE 49,760  10.3  9.0  1.3  3.0  7.0  15.0  
GROWTH 49,667  0.22  0.62  4.60  -0.03  0.10  0.29  
ROA 49,760  -0.01  0.22  -2.77  -0.05  0.03  0.09  
ROE 49,760  -0.03  0.51  -2.90  -0.10  0.07  0.18  
SGA 49,760  0.39  0.63  6.12  0.14  0.24  0.40  
IHLD 49,410  0.16  0.15  0.83  0.03  0.14  0.26  
TLMTA 49,256  0.35  0.24  0.51  0.15  0.31  0.52  
CASHMTA 49,254  0.11  0.14  2.72  0.02  0.06  0.14  
CMV 20,714  37,121  57,333  2.7 3,338 14,414  43,453  
CAGE 20,762  22.1  10.9  -0.2  15.0  23.0  30.0  
CCSALES 49,760 0.33 0.24 0.81 0.13 0.27 0.49 
CSG 20,508  0.11  0.21  2.94  0.02  0.09  0.17  
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Panel B: Profitable firm years (positive-OM sample) vs. unprofitable firm years (negative-OM sample)     
             
 Positive OM sample  Negative OM sample  Mean  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median   Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median   differences (t-stat) 
CC 38,924  0.090  0.133  0.040   10,836  0.142  0.184  0.072   -0.052  (-27.63) 
ΔCC 33,841  -0.001  0.078  0.000   9,207  -0.010  0.136  -0.002   0.009  (5.85) 
MV 38,589  990.2  4,344.9  91.9   10,746  143.0  999.0  23.2   847.2  (35.11) 
AGE 38,924  11.1  9.4  8.0   10,836  7.3  6.7  5.0   3.9  (48.63) 
GROWTH 38,902  0.22  0.49  0.12   10,765  0.21  0.93  -0.03   0.01  (0.92) 
ROA 38,924  0.06  0.10  0.05   10,836  -0.28  0.29  -0.20   0.34  (120.82) 
ROE 38,924  0.11  0.31  0.11   10,836  -0.51  0.74  -0.34   0.63  (86.44) 
SGA 38,924  0.23  0.15  0.20   10,836  0.96  1.15  0.60   -0.73  (-65.67) 
IHLD 38,627  0.17  0.15  0.15   10,783  0.14  0.15  0.10   0.02  (15.16) 
TLMTA 38,534  0.36  0.23  0.33   10,722  0.30  0.24  0.24   0.06  (22.81) 
CASHMTA 38,532  0.09  0.11  0.05   10,722  0.17  0.21  0.09   -0.08  (-38.58) 
CMV 16,527  38,193  58,279  14,759  4,187  32,889  53,231  12,317   5,303  (5.65) 
CAGE 16,560  22.5  10.7  23.0   4,202  21.0  11.4  22.0   1.5  (7.68) 
CCSALES 38,924 0.31 0.24 0.25  10,836 0.40 0.26 0.35  -0.09 (-32.18) 
CSG 16,368  0.12  0.20  0.09    4,140  0.10  0.24  0.08    0.02  (3.86) 
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Panel C: Mature firms vs. young firms           
             
 Mature firms sample  Young firms sample  Mean  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median   Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median   differences (t-stat) 
CC 24,628  0.089  0.135  0.039   25,132  0.113  0.157  0.053   -0.024  (-18.53) 
ΔCC 21,442  0.001  0.078  0.000   21,606  -0.007  0.107  0.000   0.008  (8.58) 
MV 24,476  1,108.7  4,678.3  87.0   24,859  507.2  2,872.5  50.1   601.6  (17.18) 
AGE 24,628  17.1  8.3  15.0   25,132  3.6  2.0  3.0   13.4  (246.57) 
GROWTH 24,607  0.13  0.42  0.08   25,060  0.31  0.75  0.15   -0.18  (-33.61) 
ROA 24,628  0.02  0.16  0.04   25,132  -0.05  0.26  0.02   0.06  (32.64) 
ROE 24,628  0.03  0.42  0.09   25,132  -0.08  0.58  0.05   0.11  (24.57) 
SGA 24,628  0.29  0.44  0.21   25,132  0.49  0.76  0.28   -0.19  (-34.24) 
IHLD 24,492  0.18  0.14  0.16   24,918  0.15  0.15  0.11   0.03  (22.27) 
TLMTA 24,430  0.38  0.23  0.35   24,826  0.33  0.24  0.27   0.05  (23.51) 
CASHMTA 24,428  0.10  0.13  0.05   24,826  0.12  0.16  0.06   -0.02  (-14.31) 
CMV 10,769  40,337  58,619  16,246   9,945  33,638  55,701  11,767   6,699  (8.43) 
CAGE 10,790  23.5  10.7  24.0   9,972  20.6  10.8  22.0   2.9  (19.38) 
CCSALES 24,628 0.31 0.23 0.25  25,132 0.35 0.25 0.30  -0.05 (-20.82) 
CSG 10,694  0.11  0.18  0.09   9,814  0.12  0.23  0.09    -0.02  (-6.38) 
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Figure 1: Time-series trend of customer-base concentration  
Figure 1 plots the time series of the cross sectional median of customer-base concentration over the 1977-2007 
period. The line chart shows the time-series trend of the yearly median customer-base concentration measure (CC) 
and the bar chart shows the number of supplier firms that report their major customers in COMPUSTAT customer 
segment files. 
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Table 3: Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the main diagonal 
Table 3 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the main variables used in our study. Panel A 
employs the full sample, whereas Panels B and C report the correlations for firms with positive operating margins and 
firms with negative operating margins, respectively. All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the one 
percent level (significant at p < 0.01) except for the correlations denoted by "a" (significant at p < 0.05) and the ones 
denoted by "b" (statistically insignificant). 
                    
Panel A: Full sample         
  CC MV AGE GROWTH ROA ROE SGA TLMTA CASHMTA 
CC 
 
-0.11  -0.10  0.08  -0.11  -0.08  0.18  -0.12  0.10  
MV -0.13  
 
0.19  0.06  0.25  0.22  -0.11  -0.28  -0.13  
AGE -0.11  0.18  
 
-0.21  0.16  0.12  -0.18  0.14  -0.08  
GROWTH 0.00b 0.18  -0.18  
 
-0.04  -0.02  0.07  -0.14  -0.07  
ROA -0.10  0.34  0.12  0.32  
 
0.75  -0.56  -0.03  -0.09  
ROE -0.11  0.34  0.12  0.31  0.92  
 
-0.38  -0.05  -0.05  
SGA 0.05  -0.19  -0.21  -0.06  -0.36  -0.37   -0.40  0.28  
TLMTA -0.14  -0.27  0.15  -0.21  -0.23  -0.15  -0.25  
 
-0.20  
CASHMTA 0.11  -0.05  -0.05  -0.08  -0.04  -0.09  0.21  -0.27    
          
Panel B: Positive-OM sample        
  CC MV AGE GROWTH ROA ROE SGA TLMTA CASHMTA 
CC 
 
-0.10  -0.09  0.08  0.03  0.01  -0.04  -0.09  0.10  
MV -0.12  
 
0.17  0.04  0.21  0.15  -0.05  -0.31  -0.12  
AGE -0.09  0.17  
 
-0.21  -0.04  0.00b -0.12  0.11  -0.02  
GROWTH 0.03  0.12  -0.23  
 
0.16  0.11  0.02  -0.13  -0.06  
ROA 0.01a 0.24  -0.03  0.35  
 
0.63  -0.05  -0.44  0.03  
ROE -0.02  0.25  -0.01  0.34  0.89  
 
-0.06  -0.23  -0.01b 
SGA -0.07  -0.09  -0.11  0.02  -0.01a -0.09   -0.37  0.24  
TLMTA -0.10  -0.29  0.12  -0.24  -0.52  -0.33  -0.35  
 
-0.22  
CASHMTA 0.10  -0.05  -0.02  -0.04  0.09  -0.02  0.24  -0.28    
          
Panel C: Negative-OM sample        
  CC MV AGE GROWTH ROA ROE SGA TLMTA CASHMTA 
CC 
 
0.01b -0.06  0.09  -0.07  -0.02a 0.23  -0.16  0.01b 
MV 0.01b 
 
0.03  0.12  -0.04  0.01b 0.09  -0.42  0.03  
AGE -0.06  0.03  
 
-0.24  0.19  0.10  -0.19  0.18  -0.08  
GROWTH 0.00b 0.19  -0.20  
 
-0.22  -0.13  0.11  -0.17  -0.08  
ROA -0.09  0.00b 0.22  -0.09  
 
0.65  -0.45  0.19  0.12  
ROE -0.03  0.07  0.14  -0.05  0.84  
 
-0.23  0.01b 0.16  
SGA 0.17  0.14  -0.26  0.05  -0.49  -0.30   -0.51  0.22  
TLMTA -0.18  -0.43  0.18  -0.21  0.17  -0.06  -0.34  
 
-0.13  
CASHMTA 0.04  0.14  -0.05  -0.08  0.12  0.24  0.12  -0.15    
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Figure 2: Median customer-base concentration and firm age in profitability deciles 
Figure 2 illustrates how two supplier firm characteristics, the median customer-base concentration measure (CC) and the median firm age (AGE), correlate with supplier 
firm profitability. We sort the supplier firm universe into ten deciles based on return on assets (ROA). The horizontal axis reports each portfolio's ROA decile. Portfolio 0 
(9) is the decile portfolio for the firms with the lowest (highest) ROA. The vertical axis reports the median CC for each ROA portfolio in the figures on the left hand side 
and the median firm age in the figures on the right side. Panel A illustrates the results for the full sample while Panel B describes the results for the subset of firms with 
positive operating margins. 
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Table 4: Customer-base concentration sorts in different age and profitability groups 
Table 4 reports time series averages for return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and selling, general and administrative expenses scaled by sales (SGA) for customer-
base concentration portfolios. We sort stocks into quintiles each December from December 1977 to December 2007 based on their customer-base concentration values, obtained 
at the end of the previous year. We compute the mean (median) returns on assets (ROA), returns on equity (ROE) and selling, general and administrative expenses scaled by 
sales (SGA) for these quintile portfolios on an annual basis. We report the time series averages for ROA, ROE and SGA for all the quintiles for young and mature firms 
separately. H-L is the time series average of the difference between the highest customer-base concentration portfolio and the lowest customer-base concentration portfolio for 
each variable. Young firms are those that are aged less than or equal to seven years, and mature firms are those that are aged greater than seven years. Panel A reports results for 
all observations in CRSP-COMPUSTAT while Panel B reports results for only firms with positive operating margins. H-L time series averages that are statistically significant at 
the one percent level (significant at p < 0.01) are denoted with ***,  those that are statistically significant at the five percent level (significant at p < 0.05) are denoted with **, 
and those that are statistically significant at the ten percent level (significant at p < 0.10) are denoted with *. H-L time series averages that are statistically insignificant are not 
marked. 
 
                                  
Panel A: Full sample       Panel B: Positive-OM sample    
  
Lowest 
2 3 4 
Highest 
H-L    
Lowest 
2 3 4 
Highest 
H-L 
CC CC CC CC 
Young 
Firms 
(AGE  
≤ 7) 
ROA -0.68% -3.23% -4.40% -5.61% -8.86%  -8.18%***  Young 
Firms 
(AGE  
≤ 7) 
ROA 6.00% 6.14% 5.81% 5.85% 6.94%  0.94%*** 
 (3.42%) (2.58%) (2.10%) (1.67%) (0.61%) (-2.81%)
***   (5.31%) (5.40%) (5.42%) (5.48%) (6.14%) (0.82%)
*** 
ROE -0.53% -6.41% -8.83% -10.16% -14.36% -13.83%***  ROE 11.26% 11.30% 10.06% 9.54% 12.58%  1.32%
* 
 (7.49%) (5.26%) (4.04%) (3.59%) (1.31%) (-6.17%)
***   (11.39%) (11.19%) (10.68%) (10.62%) (12.11%) (0.72%) 
 SGA 37.93% 42.41% 44.73% 48.11% 69.36%  31.43%
***   SGA 26.08% 26.32% 25.76% 23.93% 22.72%  -3.36%
*** 
  (26.42%) (27.97%) (28.64%) (27.15%) (29.04%)  (2.62%)
***    (22.52%) (23.43%) (22.37%) (21.23%) (19.12%) (-3.40%)
*** 
                 
Mature 
Firms 
(AGE  
> 7) 
ROA 3.40% 2.71% 1.62% 1.18% -0.53%  -3.93%***  Mature 
Firms 
(AGE  
> 7) 
ROA 5.75% 6.17% 5.74% 5.66% 6.19%   0.44%** 
 (4.75%) (4.59%) (4.08%) (3.82%) (3.31%) (-1.44%)
***   (5.50%) (5.57%) (5.26%) (5.25%) (5.47%) (-0.03%) 
ROE 6.93% 5.13% 3.11% 1.79% -1.52%  -8.45%***  ROE 11.62% 12.22% 10.97% 10.93% 10.26%  -1.36%
** 
 (10.75%) (9.58%) (8.50%) (7.96%) (6.53%) (-4.22%)
***   (12.15%) (11.49%) (10.81%) (10.87%) (10.46%) (-1.70%)
*** 
 SGA 26.07% 27.33% 28.49% 28.27% 37.11%  11.04%
***   SGA 22.81% 22.33% 22.03% 20.91% 20.19%  -2.63%
*** 
    (20.96%) (21.62%) (21.35%) (19.92%) (19.70%) (-1.27%)*       (19.91%) (19.91%) (19.60%) (18.28%) (16.46%) (-3.45%)*** 
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Figure 3: Median of return on assets in customer-base concentration and age groups 
Figure 3 illustrates how return on assets (ROA) changes with customer base concentration (CC) and firm age (AGE). We perform a two-way independent sort of firm-year 
observations into 5 × 5 = 25 groups based upon customer-base concentration and firm age, where age is measured from the time of the firm’s IPO. The vertical axis 
reports the median ROA for each group. One of the horizontal axes ranks the groups based upon customer-base concentration while the other horizontal axis ranks the 
groups based upon firm age. Panel A illustrates the results for the full sample while Panel B describes the results for the subset of firms with positive operating margins. 
 
Panel A: Full sample       Panel B: Positive-OM sample   
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Table 5: Customer-base concentration and supplier firm performance 
Table 5 reports the results for Fama–MacBeth regressions. We run yearly cross-sectional regressions of accounting 
performance measures on the decile rank of customer-base concentration and control variables. Our sample includes firms 
from 1977 to 2007. We only include non-financial firms which have non-missing customer-base concentration measures, 
non-missing accounting profitability measures, and non-negative book value of equity.  Panel A reports results for the full 
sample which includes both profitable and unprofitable firms, while Panel B reports results for the subset of firms that have 
positive operating margins, and Panel C reports the results for firms with negative operating margins. Panels D and E 
report the results using the samples of mature firms (AGE > 7) and young firms (AGE ≤ 7), respectively. We average the 
coefficients over time and report the means in the first rows and the corresponding Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics in the 
rows below in parentheses. Following Patatoukas (2012), we calculate the customer-base concentration measure (CC) as 
the sum of the squares of the sales shares of a supplier firm’s major customers. The dependent variables include (1) return 
on assets (ROA), (2) return on equity (ROE), (3) asset turnover (ATO), (4) profit margin (PM), (5) gross margin (GM), and 
(6) the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales (SGA). Other control variables include the log of 
market value of equity (MV), the log of firm age (AGE), annual sales growth rate (GROWTH), the indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm reports at least two business segments (CONGLO), and the leverage ratio defined as book value of 
assets divided by book value of equity (FLEV). N is the number of firm-year observations used in the regression. 
 
              
Panel A: Full sample      
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA 
Intercept -0.158  -0.343  1.038  -1.104  0.274  0.987  
 
(-5.01) (-3.46) (3.57) (-7.11) (5.26) (13.13) 
Rank(CC) -0.022  -0.039  -0.131  -0.245  -0.055  0.109  
 
(-3.85) (-3.34) (-8.90) (-4.65) (-7.82) (3.84) 
MV 0.030  0.058  -0.019  0.057  0.020  -0.034  
 
(11.69) (13.69) (-2.45) (4.80) (10.31) (-4.64) 
AGE 0.016  0.028  0.070  0.098  -0.014  -0.073  
 
(3.10) (3.47) (12.32) (3.39) (-2.08) (-11.42) 
GROWTH 0.006  0.033  0.372  0.010  0.024  0.027  
 
(0.53) (1.30) (7.76) (0.56) (3.87) (2.59) 
CONGLO -0.004  -0.005  0.001  0.055  -0.054  -0.081  
 
(-1.61) (-2.24) (0.14) (5.10) (-20.61) (-9.00) 
FLEV -0.002  -0.010  0.011  0.009  -0.005  -0.013  
 
(-2.12) (-1.33) (2.01) (3.33) (-8.00) (-7.08) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. 
       
Avg. R2 0.197  0.166  0.323  0.131  0.201  0.195  
N 49,118 49,118 49,118 49,118 49,118 49,118 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
Panel B: Positive-OM sample      Panel C: Negative-OM sample     
               
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA     ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA 
Intercept 0.018  -0.095  1.374  -0.007  0.385  0.330   Intercept -0.312  0.073  0.984  -1.584  0.168  0.984  
 (1.20) (-0.20) (5.72) (-1.40) (-6.56) (-10.98)   (-6.68) (0.37) (3.97) (-3.27) (2.30) (4.89) 
Rank(CC) 0.017  0.033  -0.045  0.017  -0.014  -0.047   Rank(CC) -0.062  -0.108  -0.378  -0.824  -0.139  0.454  
 (6.56) (4.80) (-2.22) (15.00) (-1.69) (-5.46)   (-4.86) (-3.52) (-2.66) (-8.13) (-6.46) (10.26) 
MV 0.014  0.030  -0.051  0.015  0.015  -0.007   MV 0.008  0.015  -0.029  -0.011  -0.002  0.008  
 (11.61) (10.68) (-5.19) (9.64) (-7.64) (-4.34)   (2.18) (2.50) (-1.42) (-0.51) (-0.29) (0.72) 
AGE -0.005  -0.006  0.041  -0.002  -0.024  -0.014   AGE 0.040  0.062  0.047  0.305  0.008  -0.169  
 (-1.42) (-0.87) (5.42) (-0.72) (-4.89) (-4.79)   (10.75) (6.32) (1.34) (7.14) (1.07) (-9.99) 
GROWTH 0.040  0.097  0.508  0.021  0.015  0.000   GROWTH -0.035  -0.059  0.166  0.041  0.038  0.049  
 (6.52) (5.17) (16.00) (6.63) (-3.26) (-0.20)   (-3.03) (-2.61) (2.64) (0.82) (2.53) (1.66) 
CONGLO -0.016  -0.028  -0.012  -0.013  -0.063  -0.036   CONGLO 0.023  0.055  0.053  0.257  -0.032  -0.240  
 (-11.53) (-13.74) (-2.23) (-10.84) (-32.46) (-27.95)   (3.19) (2.60) (0.80) (4.86) (-2.01) (-7.20) 
FLEV -0.004  0.017  0.006  -0.004  -0.006  -0.005   FLEV 0.001  -0.152  -0.006  0.038  -0.003  -0.025  
 (-8.77) (2.50) (1.31) (-12.82) (-9.30) (-9.34)   (0.47) (-15.65) (-0.29) (3.44) (-0.89) (-2.56) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E.  F.E. 
               Avg. R2 0.219 0.175 0.366 0.174 0.383 0.322  Avg. R
2 0.288 0.452 0.42 0.278 0.279 0.326 
N 38,542 38,542 38,542 38,542 38,542 38,542   N 10,572 10,572 10,572 10,572 10,572 10,572 
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Panel D: Mature firms (AGE>7)    Panel E: Young firms (AGE≤7)    
               
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA     ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA 
Intercept -0.088  -0.226  1.203  -0.523  0.408  0.629   Intercept -0.160  -0.335  1.132  -1.062  0.289  0.979  
 (-1.34) (-1.47) (15.30) (-2.81) (18.57) (8.73)   (-4.70) (-3.20) (3.62) (-7.27) (5.22) (11.70) 
Rank(CC) -0.004  -0.011  -0.071  -0.112  -0.043  0.023   Rank(CC) -0.038  -0.062  -0.184  -0.368  -0.067  0.179  
 (-0.75) (-0.90) (-1.67) (-2.63) (-3.40) (0.60)   (-3.84) (-3.64) (-11.38) (-4.93) (-4.91) (5.88) 
MV 0.021  0.043  -0.029  0.032  0.020  -0.017   MV 0.043  0.081  -0.009  0.093  0.024  -0.058  
 (13.69) (32.75) (-5.31) (4.12) (10.78) (-3.19)   (8.81) (8.96) (-0.81) (3.93) (10.49) (-4.08) 
AGE 0.010  0.017  0.106  0.074  -0.050  -0.084   AGE 0.014  0.019  0.056  0.138  0.011  -0.077  
 (1.03) (0.61) (11.28) (3.58) (-6.03) (-8.58)   (3.60) (2.46) (2.77) (4.72) (1.72) (-8.91) 
GROWTH 0.044  0.115  0.531  0.095  0.041  -0.017   GROWTH -0.006  0.005  0.342  -0.020  0.016  0.034  
 (3.70) (5.10) (9.60) (5.71) (4.96) (-2.42)   (-0.39) (0.16) (5.61) (-0.46) (3.27) (2.05) 
CONGLO -0.008  -0.018  -0.039  0.012  -0.041  -0.040   CONGLO 0.005  0.016  0.041  0.114  -0.059  -0.134  
 (-5.11) (-9.13) (-1.72) (2.36) (-6.02) (-5.05)   (1.20) (3.39) (1.91) (5.70) (-11.86) (-7.71) 
FLEV -0.003  0.002  0.004  0.001  -0.004  -0.007   FLEV -0.001  -0.024  0.016  0.017  -0.006  -0.018  
 (-3.61) (0.37) (0.54) (0.80) (-4.29) (-4.27)   (-0.88) (-3.14) (1.92) (2.45) (-7.03) (-4.53) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. F.E. 
               
Avg. R2 0.234  0.208  0.393  0.166  0.280  0.239   Avg. R
2 0.237  0.210  0.343  0.161  0.213  0.220  
N 24,455 24,455 24,455 24,455 24,455 24,455   N 24,663 24,663 24,663 24,663 24,663 24,663 
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Table 6: Changes in customer-base concentration and changes in supplier firm performance 
Table 6 reports the results for Fama–MacBeth regressions. Changes in return on assets (ROA) and SG&A costs (SGA) are calculated in year t+1, whereas the decile rank of 
the annual change in customer-base concentration and control variables are calculated in year t.  We run annual regressions of year t to year t+1 changes in ROA and SGA on 
the decile rank of annual change in customer-base concentration from year t-1 to year t and on year t values of a list of control variables. Our sample includes firms from 
1977 to 2007. We only include non-financial firms with non-missing customer-base concentration firm-year observations, non-missing accounting profitability measures, and 
non-negative book value of equity. Panel A reports results for the full sample of firm year observations, while Panels B and C report results for the sub-samples of young 
(AGE≤ 7) and mature firms (AGE > 7), respectively. In all panels, we average the coefficients over time and report the means in the first rows and the corresponding Newey-
West-adjusted t-statistics in the rows below in parentheses. The dependent variables are (1) one-year ahead change in return on assets (ΔROA t+1) and (2) one-year ahead 
change in the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales (ΔSGAt+1). Rank(ΔCC t) is the decile rank of annual change in customer-base concentration scaled 
to be bounded between 0 and 1. Other control variables are profit margin (PMt), asset turnover (ATOt), annual change in profit margin (ΔPM t) and annual change in asset 
turnover (ΔATO t). N is the number of firm-year observations used in the regression. 
                      
Panel A: Full sample   Panel B: Young firms (AGE≤ 7)  Panel C: Mature firms (AGE> 7) 
 (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
  ΔROAt+1 ΔSGAt+1  
  ΔROAt+1 ΔSGAt+1  
  ΔROAt+1 ΔSGAt+1 
Intercept 0.012  -0.034  
 
Intercept 0.029  0.085  
 
Intercept 0.016  0.014  
 
(0.22) (0.80) 
  
(0.20) (0.89) 
  
(0.36) (0.84) 
Rankt(ΔCC) -0.007  0.017   Rankt(ΔCC) 
-0.009  0.020  
 Rankt(ΔCC) 
-0.005  0.006  
 
(-2.22) (6.07) 
  
(-2.02) (2.03) 
  
(-1.05) (1.03) 
PMt -0.076  0.047   PMt 
-0.070  0.045  
 PMt 
-0.079  0.052  
 
(-1.50) (1.86) 
  
(-1.58) (1.19) 
  
(-1.59) (2.68) 
ATOt -0.010  -0.002   ATOt 
-0.014  0.001  
 ATOt 
-0.010  -0.004  
 
(-12.71) (-1.04) 
  
(-9.15) (0.16) 
  
(-7.06) (-1.36) 
ΔPMt 0.021  0.024   ΔPMt 
0.021  0.024  
 ΔPMt 
-0.010  0.022  
 
(0.78) (0.97) 
  
(0.88) (0.69) 
  
(-1.82) (1.15) 
ΔATO t 0.003  0.000   ΔATO t 
0.007  0.001  
 ΔATO t 
0.008  0.001  
 
(1.10) (0.08) 
  
(1.37) (0.17) 
  
(1.09) (1.41) 
Industry 
Yes Yes 
 
Industry 
Yes Yes 
 
Industry 
Yes Yes 
F.E. F.E. F.E. 
Avg. R2 0.120  0.191   Avg. R
2 0.159  0.236   Avg. R
2 0.167  0.279  
N 35,668 35,419   N 15,672 15,525   N 19,996 19,894 
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Table 7: Operating performance drivers for young firms 
In Table 7 we analyze the impact of customer-base concentration on the operating performance of young firms (AGE ≤ 7).  
Our sample includes firm year observations from  1977 to 2007. In Panel A, the dependent variables include asset turnover 
components as well as selling, general and administrative expenses: (1) IHLD: the ratio of inventory to the book value of 
total assets, (2) INVT: inventory turnover, (3) RCVBLE: account receivables turnover, (4) NPP&E: net PP&E turnover, (5) 
INTANG: intangible asset turnover, (6) CASH: cash turnover, (7) ADVERT: advertising expense to sales, and (8) SGA: 
the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales. In Panel B, we analyze working capital efficiencies for 
young firms using the following dependent variables: (1) DAYS_RCVBLE: days’ receivables measured as the ratio of 
accounts receivable to sales multiplied by 365, (2) DAYS_PAYBLE: days’ payables measured as the ratio of accounts 
payable to cost of goods sold multiplied by 365, (3) DAYS_INVT: days’ inventory measured as the ratio of inventory to 
cost of goods sold multiplied by 365, (4) TOTCYCLE: total cash conversion cycle measured as days’ receivables minus 
days’ payables plus days’ inventory, and (5) DOUBTFUL: provisions for doubtful accounts; measured as the ratio of 
estimated doubtful accounts receivable to total accounts receivable. The main independent variable is Rank(CC), the 
corresponding decile rank of the firm based on its customer-base concentration score. Other control variables include the 
log of market value of equity (MV), the log of firm age (AGE), annual sales growth rate (GROWTH), the indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm reports at least two business segments (CONGLO), and the leverage ratio defined as book 
value of assets divided by book value of equity (FLEV). N is the number of firm-year observations used in the regression. 
                 
 Panel A: Asset turnover components, advertising expenses and SG&A per dollar of sales  
      
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                         Asset turnover components 
 
  
  IHLD INVT  RCVBLE NPP&E  INTANG  CASH  ADVERT SGA 
Intercept 0.186  37.394  17.643  22.442  200.137  21.876  0.021  0.979  
 
(5.18) (1.64) (2.65) (3.72) (1.87) (1.34) (4.96) (11.70) 
Rank(CC) -0.037  3.771  0.871  -0.138  -1.844  -18.327  -0.003  0.179  
 
(-4.45) (1.77) (3.64) (-0.14) (-0.07) (-5.93) (-2.33) (5.88) 
MV -0.013  0.317  0.063  -1.089  3.433  -3.088  -0.001  -0.058  
 
(-21.64) (0.80) (0.60) (-3.10) (0.51) (-3.47) (-3.19) (-4.08) 
AGE 0.010  -2.476  -0.261  -1.695  -29.993  10.662  -0.002  -0.077  
 
(2.93) (-2.17) (-0.78) (-1.45) (-2.07) (4.07) (-3.14) (-8.91) 
GROWTH -0.003  11.781  7.083  10.831  10.436  4.039  0.002  0.034  
 
(-1.95) (5.34) (23.56) (6.31) (0.93) (1.95) (2.47) (2.05) 
CONGLO -0.004  2.003  -0.530  -3.076  -27.639  -5.724  -0.004  -0.134  
 
(-0.66) (1.41) (-1.22) (-2.71) (-1.46) (-1.03) (-8.84) (-7.71) 
FLEV 0.002  -0.293  -0.036  0.555  0.088  5.847  -0.001  -0.018  
 
(3.71) (-0.78) (-0.37) (1.58) (0.04) (4.12) (-6.18) (-4.53) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
F.E.  
         
Avg. R2 0.468  0.310  0.289  0.202  0.166  0.187  0.146  0.220  
N 24,451 19,998 24,459 24,640 11,362 24,442 24,662 24,663 
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Panel B: Cash conversion cycle components and collectability of accounts receivable 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Cash conversion cycle 
TOTCYCLE DOUBTFUL 
  DAYS_ RCVBLE 
DAYS_ 
PAYBLE 
DAYS_ 
INVT 
Intercept 98.122  36.173  100.487  197.551  0.070  
 
(7.33) (0.68) (9.23) (2.94) (5.25) 
Rank(CC) 20.064  56.234  -3.752  -24.775  -0.005  
 
(5.89) (5.73) (-1.26) (-2.84) (-2.83) 
MV -3.476  -6.477  -4.558  -1.870  -0.006  
 
(-6.22) (-1.95) (-7.21) (-1.31) (-18.63) 
AGE -3.854  -15.640  2.054  14.173  0.003  
 
(-2.23) (-1.94) (1.54) (2.53) (2.35) 
GROWTH -31.484  -11.731  -23.387  -43.188  0.000  
 
(-16.09) (-1.90) (-8.89) (-11.39) (0.05) 
CONGLO -4.814  -45.238  -12.862  23.127  -0.004  
 
(-1.59) (-6.16) (-7.08) (6.38) (-4.13) 
FLEV 1.001  10.432  -0.601  -9.961  0.001  
 
(1.18) (2.41) (-1.41) (-2.34) (1.58) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. 
      
Avg. R2 0.184  0.150  0.258  0.194  0.171  
Obs. 24,569 24,647 24,452 24,368 18,251 
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Table 8: Elasticity of operating expenses with respect to sales and demand uncertainty in customer base concentration quintiles 
Panel A of Table 8 reports panel data means of operating expenses as a percentage of sales. Panel B of Table 8 reports the mean and median elasticity values of costs of goods 
sold (COGS) and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) with respect to sales. Panel C of Table 8 reports the mean and median values of demand uncertainty for 
each customer-base concentration quintile. The marginal elasticity of COGS (SG&A expense) with respect to sales of firm i in year t is calculated as the change in log-COGS 
(SG&A expense) for firm i from year t-1 to year t , ΔlnCOGSi,t (ΔlnSG&A i,t), divided by the change in log-sales for firm i from year t-1 to year t (ΔlnSales i,t). The demand 
uncertainty for firm i is defined as the standard deviation of annual changes in log-sales. Following Banker et al. (2012), we estimate demand uncertainty on a rolling basis, using 
the data for the most recent 5 years. H-L column reports the cross-sectional differences between the mean and median COGS elasticity, SG&A elasticity and demand uncertainty 
estimations of the highest and lowest customer-base concentration quintiles.  N is the number of firm-year observations. H-L cross-sectional differences that are statistically 
significant at the one percent level (significant at p < 0.01) are denoted with ***,  those that are statistically significant at the five percent level (significant at p < 0.05) are 
denoted with **, and those that are statistically significant at the ten percent level (significant at p < 0.10) are denoted with *. H-L cross-sectional differences that are statistically 
insignificant are not marked. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Customer base concentration and elasticity of operating expenses with respect to sales   
Customer-base 
Concentration 
COGS Elasticity   SG&A Elasticity   
N Mean Median   N Mean Median   
Lowest 9,867 0.97 0.98  9,867 0.79 0.83  
2 9,889 0.95 0.97  9,889 0.72 0.74  
3 9,889 0.91 0.96  9,889 0.69 0.7  
4 9,843 0.92 0.96  9,845 0.66 0.65  
Highest 9,727 0.87 0.96  9,727 0.56 0.52  
         
H - L       -0.10***     -0.02*** 
  
    -0.23***     -0.31***   
 
 
Panel A: Operating expenses 
Item % of Sales 
Cost of Goods Sold 64.4% 
SG&A Expenses 39.1% 
Advertising Expense   1.0% 
Non-advertising SG&A Expenses 38.1% 
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 Panel C: Customer base concentration and demand uncertainty 
Customer-base 
Concentration 
Demand Uncertainty  
N Mean Median   
Lowest 7,030 0.19 0.13  
2 7,024 0.22 0.15  
3 6,722 0.24 0.17  
4 6,282 0.26 0.19  
Highest 5,838 0.32 0.22  
     
H - L        0.12***     0.09***   
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Table 9: Determinants of firm failure within five (seven) years of initial public offering  
Table 9 shows the logistic failure regression estimates for all firms with an initial public offering (IPO) date between 1980 and 2000.  
The dependent variable used in columns (1) and (2) is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm fails within five years of its IPO, 
following Demers and Joos (2007). The dependent variable used in columns (3) and (4) is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm 
fails within seven years of its IPO, following our definition of young (AGE ≤ 7) firms. Each year firms are sorted into ten portfolios 
based on their customer-base concentration measure (CC), which is described in detail in Table 1. Rank(CC) is the corresponding 
decile rank of the firm at the time of its IPO based on the CC score. UNDERWRITER is the Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation 
ranking. VC indicator variable is set equal to 1 if the firm is venture capital backed. AUDITOR indicator variable is equal to 1 if the 
firm has Big 8 or a national firm auditor. IPO_MARKET is the initial return to all IPOs in the 90 days prior to the firm’s IPO. 
FIRSTDAYRET is the first-day initial returns: closing price on the IPO date less offer price as a percentage of the offer price. 
OFFERPRICE is the inflation-adjusted IPO offer price. INC_AGE is the natural log of one plus firm age measured in years from the 
date of incorporation and is different from the variable AGE used in Tables 1 through 6. IPO_LEV is equal to total liabilities 
divided by the sum of total assets plus the proceeds raised at the time of IPO. RD is the natural log of one plus R&D expense. 
LSGA is the natural log of selling, general, and administrative expenses. GM is the ratio of sales minus cost of goods sold to sales. 
DEFICIT is the negative log of retained earnings if the firm is in a deficit position, 0 otherwise. SALE is the log of one plus sales in 
millions generated for the year prior to the IPO. All independent variables are measured at the time of IPO. Values of z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  N is the total number of firm-IPO-years in the sample and # of Failures is the 
number of failure events observed in the entirety of the sample. McFadden pseudo R2 values are reported for each regression.    
     
  Failure within 5 years of IPO Failure within 7 years of IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.160  0.796  1.658  1.411  
 
(3.90) (2.35) (6.16) (4.65) 
Rank(CC)  0.512   0.347  
  
(2.24)  (1.76) 
UNDERWRITER -0.158  -0.160  -0.134  -0.136  
 (-4.02) (-4.07) (-3.97) (-4.02) 
VC -0.067  -0.062  -0.148  -0.144  
 (-0.37) (-0.35) (-0.98) (-0.95) 
AUDITOR -0.273  -0.270  -0.351  -0.350  
 (-1.36) (-1.34) (-1.94) (-1.94) IPO_MARKET 1.883  1.870  1.151  1.135  
 (3.88) (3.85) (2.58) (2.54) 
FIRSTDAYRET -0.281  -0.291  -0.135  -0.142  
 (-1.04) (-1.07) (-0.59) (-0.62) 
OFFERPRICE -0.061  -0.062  -0.034  -0.034  
 (-3.68) (-3.70) (-2.75) (-2.75) INC_AGE -0.323  -0.325  -0.295  -0.295  
 (-3.78) (-3.79) (-4.03) (-4.02) 
IPO_LEV 2.186  2.205  1.932  1.946  
 (4.88) (4.92) (4.92) (4.96) 
RD -0.675  -0.696  -0.390  -0.404  
 (-4.71) (-4.84) (-3.43) (-3.54) LSGA 0.444  0.471  0.243  0.262  
 (2.88) (3.06) (1.88) (2.03) 
GM -0.993  -0.944  -1.281  -1.238  
 (-2.97) (-2.82) (-4.38) (-4.22) 
DEFICIT -0.082  -0.075  -0.022  -0.018  
 (-1.10) (-1.02) (-0.35) (-0.28) SALES -0.560  -0.545  -0.495  -0.487  
 
(-5.65) (-5.51) (-5.87) (-5.78) 
     
# of Failures 292 292 415 415 
N 2,431 2,431 2,431 2,431 
Pseudo R2 0.222  0.224  0.186  0.188  
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Table 10: Dynamic failure prediction 
Table 10 reports results from dynamic logistic regressions of the failure indicator on the predictor variables for all firms in CRSP-
COMPUSTAT between the years of 1980 and 2007. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm fails in a 
given year, where failure is defined in the spirit of Demers and Joos (2007). The data are constructed such that all independent 
variables are observable 12 months before the failure event. Each year firms are sorted into ten portfolios based on their customer-
base concentration measure (CC), which is described in detail in Table 1. Rank(CC) is the corresponding decile rank of the firm in a 
given year based on its customer-base concentration score. Firm age (AGE) is measured in years from the time of IPO. TLMTA is 
the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets and is used as a measure of leverage. NIMTA is the ratio of net income 
to the market value of total assets, and is used as a measure of profitability. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
over the previous three months. MB is the market-to-book ratio. RSIZE is the log ratio of market capitalization to the market value 
of the S&P 500 index. CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets. EXRET is the monthly log excess stock 
return relative to the S&P 500 index. Values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  N is the total 
number of firm-year observations in the sample and # of Failures is the number of failure events observed in the entirety of the 
sample. McFadden pseudo R2 values are reported for each regression.  
          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Failure Failure Failure Failure 
Intercept -14.040  -14.159  -14.172  -4.450  
 
(-31.70) (-31.75) (-31.67) (-61.66) 
Rank(CC)  0.401  0.520  0.948  
  
(3.21) (3.71) (7.63) 
AGE * Rank(CC)   -0.015  -0.037  
   
(-1.79) (-4.56) 
TLMTA 2.380  2.456  2.482   
 
(13.79) (14.08) (14.18)  
NIMTA -21.716  -21.560  -21.482   
 
(-13.48) (-13.38) (-13.31)  
SIGMA 0.457  0.454  0.426   
 
(3.87) (3.84) (3.57)  
MB 0.291  0.286  0.284   
 
(10.24) (10.05) (9.94)  
RSIZE -0.675  -0.666  -0.669   
 
(-18.68) (-18.33) (-18.33)  
CASHMTA -1.251  -1.302  -1.347   
 
(-3.57) (-3.71) (-3.83)  
EXRET -4.123  -4.097  -3.999   
 (-5.33) (-5.30) (-5.16)  
     
# of Failures 771 771 771 771 
N 48,948 48,948 48,948 48,948 
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.210 0.211 0.008 
 
 
 
